The Wisconsin Supreme Court has declined to immediately suspend former Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan’s law license after her federal felony conviction, leaving her able to practice while the state’s lawyer-regulation process continues.
In a Sept. 16 order, the court denied the Office of Lawyer Regulation’s request for a summary suspension under Supreme Court Rule 22.20. The majority said that, “under the facts of this case,” an interim suspension was not warranted. The order resolves only whether Dugan should lose her license before a full disciplinary proceeding; it does not end the regulator’s authority to pursue discipline.
The case began after the office asked the court to act on Dugan’s federal conviction. A July 22 show-cause order said regulators relied on her conviction for obstructing proceedings before federal departments, agencies and committees under 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The court directed Dugan to explain within 20 days why the motion should not be granted.
Under the rule cited by the regulator, a “serious crime” includes a felony. The rule permits the justices to suspend a lawyer on an interim basis after receiving proof of conviction, but the court still must decide whether that step is appropriate. That distinction shaped the split: the majority exercised its discretion against immediate suspension, while the dissent would have acted on the conviction.
Dugan was convicted in Milwaukee federal court of obstruction but acquitted of a separate charge of concealing a person from arrest. She later received no prison time and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine, according to Reuters’ account of the proceedings. Dugan has appealed, arguing in part that judicial immunity and federalism principles bar the prosecution.
The disciplinary question is distinct from the criminal appeal. Wisconsin’s high court has constitutional authority over admission to the bar and attorney discipline, while the Office of Lawyer Regulation investigates and prosecutes alleged misconduct. The court’s public notice accompanying the order confirms that the summary-suspension motion was denied rather than dismissed as a broader disciplinary matter.
Justice Annette Ziegler, joined by Justice Brian Hagedorn, dissented. Ziegler wrote that Dugan’s license remains active and in good standing and argued that the felony conviction met the rule’s standard for a temporary suspension. She also noted that the Office of Lawyer Regulation may continue with a complaint, but that no rule requires it to do so on an expedited schedule once summary suspension is denied.
For Wisconsin lawyers and clients, the practical result is narrow but immediate: Dugan is not barred from legal work solely because of the July motion. Any later sanction would require additional action through the state disciplinary system or a different court order.
The decision also illustrates the difference between an emergency professional restriction and final discipline. A summary suspension is designed to protect the public while a case proceeds; denying it does not decide whether professional rules were violated or what sanction, if any, would ultimately be appropriate.
