Air France and KLM face a combined $425,000 in U.S. penalties for operating more than 130 flights carrying Delta Air Lines’ code below the permitted altitude over Iraq, the Transportation Department announced October 23. The cases put airline flight planning and international marketing partnerships under scrutiny: a foreign aircraft can fall under U.S. airspace restrictions because of the flight number used to sell its seats.

The department said Air France’s violations occurred between April 2022 and November 2025, while KLM’s occurred between January 2022 and May 2025. Both carriers were ordered to stop future violations. The announcement concerns past operations, rather than a newly imposed closure of Iraqi airspace.

A marketing code carries regulatory obligations

Code sharing allows an airline to place its own designator on a flight operated by a partner and sell tickets for that service. Here, the aircraft were operated by Air France or KLM but also carried Delta’s DL code. That commercial link subjected the services to conditions attached to their U.S. authorization.

The KLM order explains that foreign carriers may not place a U.S. partner’s code on flights entering airspace where the Federal Aviation Administration prohibits U.S. operators from flying. DOT found that more than 100 KLM services breached that condition. It treated the conduct as unauthorized foreign air transportation under federal law, making the marketing arrangement central to the enforcement case.

The distinction matters for travelers whose ticket bears one airline’s name while another supplies the aircraft and crew. The orders show that codesharing carries obligations beyond commercial cooperation. They do not establish that every foreign flight over Iraq is subject to the same U.S. prohibition.

Why the altitude restriction exists

The applicable threshold is Flight Level 320, conventionally described as 32,000 feet. The FAA’s 2024 rule extended the restriction on covered operations below that level in the Baghdad Flight Information Region through October 26, 2027. It cited risks from Iranian-aligned militia activity and military operations that might not be effectively separated from civilian aviation.

This is a restriction on a defined volume of airspace, not a blanket declaration that all overflights at every altitude are forbidden. The FAA raised the prohibited-altitude boundary from Flight Level 260 to Flight Level 320 in 2020 and subsequently extended it. The agency’s rationale addresses exposure to conflict-related hazards; it does not quantify the probability of an attack on any particular flight.

The underlying rule also provides routes for approved operations and exemptions. Those mechanisms matter because an airspace prohibition is not simply an advisory that an airline can weigh against convenience or traffic conditions. Any relief has to fit the regulatory framework, while the emergency provision addresses circumstances requiring an immediate safety decision.

The airlines cite controllers’ instructions

Air France and KLM argued that their crews intended to fly above the restricted level but encountered conflicting traffic. Local controllers instructed them to descend or would not authorize a climb, the carriers said. Both maintained that the safety implications of refusing those instructions brought the flights within an emergency exception, according to Reuters.

The regulation permits a pilot to deviate when an emergency requires immediate decisions and action for flight safety, but only to the extent the emergency requires. That provision preserves room for an urgent cockpit response. It does not itself settle whether repeated encounters with a known operational constraint qualify.

In its Air France order, DOT expressly distinguished pilots’ airborne decisions from the airline’s planning responsibilities. The department said the carrier should have anticipated recurring altitude instructions after the first instances and taken preventive measures, such as rerouting or removing Delta’s code. It rejected the emergency argument on that basis; the same reasoning appears in KLM’s settlement.

Part of the penalty is conditional

Air France’s assessed penalty is $105,000, with $65,000 payable within 60 days. The remaining $40,000 becomes payable if it breaches the order’s payment or cease-and-desist provisions within one year. KLM’s $320,000 assessment similarly requires $200,000 within 60 days, with $120,000 conditional on compliance.

Thus, $265,000 of the combined assessment is initially due, while $160,000 remains contingent. Both orders say they become final 10 days after service unless a timely review petition is filed or DOT initiates review. The settlements resolve potential civil penalties without litigation; they should not be described as criminal convictions.

A test of planning before departure

For airline partnerships, the practical issue is whether dispatch plans and code-sharing arrangements account for restrictions that crews may encounter in operation. DOT’s position makes repeated experience consequential: a constraint that initially arises in flight can become foreseeable for subsequent departures. Compliance therefore depends on decisions made before passengers board as well as actions in the cockpit.

The public records document regulatory violations and the carriers’ explanations, but do not establish a measured increase in passenger injury risk for each flight. Their clearest finding is institutional: selling a partner-operated service under a U.S. code carries enforceable airspace conditions, and repeated deviations cannot be addressed solely as isolated emergencies.