A federal judge has dismissed a challenge to Tennessee’s human-smuggling statute because the plaintiffs did not show a credible threat that prosecutors would enforce the law against them. The ruling leaves the statute in effect, but it does not decide whether the law is constitutional.
Chief U.S. District Judge William L. Campbell Jr. issued the decision September 30 in a case brought by the Southeastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Nashville landlord Garrett Causey and an immigrant identified as John Doe. Their lawsuit named Tennessee’s 32 district attorneys general and sought to block enforcement of Tennessee Code § 39-17-118.
In the court’s memorandum opinion, Campbell concluded that none of the plaintiffs had established the injury needed to bring a pre-enforcement lawsuit. The court found no specific warning, investigation or prosecution directed at their activities and said the plaintiffs’ concern about possible enforcement was too speculative to create federal jurisdiction.
The dismissal was without prejudice. That means the plaintiffs were not barred from filing a future case if circumstances change and they can show a concrete threat of enforcement. The judge did not reach their arguments that the law is vague, intrudes on federal immigration authority or burdens religious exercise. Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti’s office likewise acknowledged in announcing the dismissal that the court did not rule on constitutionality.
The law took effect July 1, 2025. Its operative language makes human smuggling a Class E felony when a person, for commercial advantage or private financial gain, knowingly transports someone with intent to conceal that person from law enforcement while knowing the person is unlawfully present, or intentionally conceals, harbors or shields such a person from detection. The statute relies on a federal immigration determination and defines “harbor” as providing shelter or concealing a person’s whereabouts.
Aggravated human smuggling is a Class A felony when the victim was younger than 13 during the conduct. The statute expressly exempts bona fide legal advice and health services or assistance provided at licensed facilities or practices. It does not contain a general exemption for religious organizations or landlords.
The plaintiffs sued shortly before the law took effect. In their complaint, they said the wording could expose churches, housing providers and others serving immigrants to criminal liability. When the case was filed, The Washington Post reported that the synod viewed sheltering migrants as part of its religious mission, while the law’s legislative sponsors said it was aimed at paid smugglers and organized trafficking rather than churches or landlords.
The court’s standing analysis turned on that gap between the activities the plaintiffs described and the conduct the statute expressly targets for financial gain. Campbell wrote that the record did not show prosecutors had threatened to treat the plaintiffs’ ministries, rentals or personal arrangements as crimes.
For Tennessee residents and organizations, the immediate result is continuity: the statute remains enforceable under the same terms that have applied since July 2025. The unresolved question is whether a future prosecution or a more specific enforcement threat would produce a plaintiff with standing and allow a court to consider the constitutional issues on their merits.
