China’s coast guard said Wednesday that it was “safeguarding order” around the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands, sharpening a dispute over who can police a strategically placed atoll at the northern edge of the South China Sea.
The assertion followed two encounters reported by Taiwan since Sunday and a separate Chinese naval response to a U.S. warship near Sabina Shoal, farther south. Taken together, the episodes show Beijing pressing its maritime claims through both coast guard and military channels while Taiwan, the Philippines and the United States reject China’s account of its authority.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said patrols near Pratas were lawful enforcement operations meant to protect navigation and normal activity. Taiwan says the patrols are an attempt to make Chinese jurisdiction appear routine. The disagreement is not merely rhetorical: each encounter forces ships to decide how closely to approach, whether to issue warnings and when to disengage.
Two encounters put jurisdiction at the center
On Tuesday, Taiwan’s Coast Guard said it sent the Taichung to confront a Chinese coast guard vessel that entered waters Taipei designates as restricted near Pratas. During the standoff, the two crews exchanged sharply conflicting radio messages about Taiwan’s political status, according to a detailed Reuters report.
Beijing then publicly defended its presence. A Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson said Wednesday that China has “indisputable sovereignty” over Pratas and nearby waters and described coast guard activity there as normal law enforcement. Taiwan rejects that position and administers the atoll, which has no permanent civilian population and is guarded by its coast guard rather than a large military garrison.
The latest encounter fits a pattern rather than an isolated voyage. Taiwan has reported two Chinese coast guard approaches to Pratas since Sunday, and the repeated operations require Taipei to keep larger patrol assets available far from Taiwan’s main island. Each side now describes its own presence as routine and the other’s as a provocation, making operational restraint harder to separate from political concession.
Pratas is becoming a regular pressure point
Pratas, also called Dongsha, sits more than 400 kilometers southwest of Taiwan and roughly between southern Taiwan and Hong Kong. Its remoteness makes reinforcement more difficult and gives control of nearby waters strategic value. Beijing’s use of coast guard ships also keeps many confrontations below the threshold of an overt military operation.
Ship-tracking research indicates that this presence has grown steadily. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative analyzed Automatic Identification System transmissions and Taiwan Coast Guard releases from 2021 through 2025. It found 94 days of Chinese coast guard or maritime-safety activity around Pratas during that period, including 60 days in 2025, up from 25 in 2024. The AMTI analysis cautions, in effect, that AIS data is incomplete because vessels can stop broadcasting, but the documented trend is still substantial.
The operational effect can accumulate even without a collision. Repeated dispatches consume fuel, crew time and maintenance capacity, while every unchallenged passage can later be presented as evidence that a patrol pattern has become normal. That is why both governments emphasize jurisdictional language alongside the movement of ships: the contest is over precedent as well as immediate control.
Sabina Shoal adds a U.S.-Philippine dimension
Farther south on Tuesday, China’s Southern Theatre Command said it dispatched forces to track the USS Charleston near Sabina Shoal in the Spratly Islands. Beijing said the American ship entered adjacent waters without permission and harmed regional security. The U.S. Navy said the vessel was conducting routine operations in international waters consistent with international law. A Philippine military spokesperson also said the ship had not entered Chinese territory.
The competing statements reveal the practical dispute: Beijing says foreign military activity in contested areas can require its consent, while Washington says all states retain navigation rights in international waters. The UNCLOS text provides that all states enjoy navigation and overflight freedoms in an exclusive economic zone, subject to the convention’s other rules.
The legal record does not settle sovereignty
A 2016 arbitral tribunal rejected the legal basis for expansive Chinese “historic rights” claims beyond the maritime zones allowed by UNCLOS. The PCA record says the case addressed maritime entitlements and the status of features, not a comprehensive award of sovereignty over every disputed land feature.
China did not participate in the proceedings and continues to reject the award. Its Foreign Ministry calls the decision null and void and argues that territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation should be resolved through negotiations, according to Beijing’s formal position. That divide means legal language remains central to each side’s public case even as enforcement vessels determine what happens at sea.
What comes next
The immediate test is whether Chinese patrols near Pratas become persistent enough to change operating assumptions for Taiwan’s coast guard. More frequent close approaches increase the chances of collision, miscalculation or an escalation triggered by warning maneuvers rather than a deliberate decision to use force.
The parallel encounter near Sabina also widens the set of actors managing risk. Chinese naval commanders, U.S. crews and Philippine forces now have to distinguish signaling from preparation for coercion while operating around disputed waters. So far, the reported episodes have remained controlled. Their significance lies in repetition: regular patrols can normalize a contested claim long before any government formally changes its policy.