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# U.S. Regulators Question Waymo’s Software Fix for School Bus Stops
- URL: https://www.theamericanquorum.com/us-regulators-question-waymos-software-fix-for-school-bus-stops/
- Published: 2026-11-10T05:04:21.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-10T05:04:21.000Z
- Description: Federal regulators are reviewing 2,895 Waymo vehicles after reports of robotaxis passing stopped school buses. Investigators say most incidents they identified occurred after Waymo finished installing its recall update.
- Author: News Desk
- Tags: US, Georgia, Texas

Federal auto safety regulators disclosed Monday that they are investigating whether a Waymo software update adequately addressed a defect that could cause its driverless cars to pass stopped school buses. The new inquiry covers 2,895 vehicles equipped with Waymo’s fifth-generation automated driving system. Most of the incidents identified in the agency’s earlier review occurred after Waymo said it had finished installing the fix, according to the [investigation notice](https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2026/INOA-RQ26006-19477.pdf?ref=theamericanquorum.com).

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration opened the recall query on Nov. 6, according to its records, and confirmed the inquiry Monday, [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-opens-probe-into-2895-waymo-vehicles-over-school-bus-safety-violations-2026-11-09/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) reported. The agency is examining both whether the original fix was adequate and why incidents were reported after it was installed. The query does not announce a second recall or a finding that all later violations had the same cause.

## What the update was meant to fix

Waymo said in its [recall report](https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2025/RCLRPT-25E084-7732.pdf?ref=theamericanquorum.com) that affected cars could start slowing or come to a stop when they encountered a school bus with flashing red lights or an extended stop arm, then move again before the warning had ended. The company traced that behavior to a feature intended to avoid blocking priority vehicles. In some encounters, the software decided the Waymo car might be in the way of the bus or another priority vehicle, prompting it to move when it should have remained stopped.

Waymo said its update changed that decision so the car would remain stationary instead of moving to clear the way. The company reported installing the update from Nov. 5 through Nov. 17, 2025, and filed its voluntary recall on Dec. 10\. The [safety board](https://www-s.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/HWY26FH007.aspx?ref=theamericanquorum.com) put the original recall population at 3,067 vehicles. The new inquiry lists 2,895\. The two figures describe the scope of separate actions and do not show how many cars were observed passing a bus.

## What investigators documented in two cities

The agency’s [earlier review](https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2025/INCLA-PE25013-57429.pdf?ref=theamericanquorum.com) began in October 2025 after a report of a Waymo vehicle passing a school bus in Atlanta, Georgia. The closing record also identifies traffic citations provided by the Austin Independent School District in Texas. [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-opens-probe-into-2895-waymo-vehicles-over-school-bus-safety-violations-2026-11-09/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) reported that Austin schools documented 19 distinct violations and that Atlanta public schools recorded six. Those reports brought the issue to federal attention because the cars operated on ordinary streets where buses were loading or unloading students.

A separate National Transportation Safety Board [preliminary report](https://www-s.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/HWY26FH007.aspx?ref=theamericanquorum.com) details what happened in one Austin case on Jan. 12, 2026\. The unoccupied Waymo vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction from a school bus and was the first vehicle to stop for it. The bus had its red lights flashing and stop arms extended while picking up students. The Waymo vehicle then asked its remote assistance service whether it was seeing a school bus with active signals.

The agent answered no, the board said, and the vehicle proceeded while the stop arms were still out. Five other vehicles also passed the bus during the stop. No crash occurred. The account describes the sequence in one case; the board says it is still investigating probable cause. It does not establish that a remote assistance response was involved in the other incidents or that the specific software behavior Waymo recalled caused the January event.

## How Waymo has responded

Waymo said it had substantially improved how its vehicles behave around school buses and had received no citations for passing them since March 2026\. A company spokesperson gave that account to [WIRED](https://www.wired.com/story/waymo-school-bus-problem-the-us-government-says-it-didnt-work/?ref=theamericanquorum.com); [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-opens-probe-into-2895-waymo-vehicles-over-school-bus-safety-violations-2026-11-09/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) also reported that Waymo plans to respond to the inquiry. The company’s statement concerns citations. It does not supply a count of all encounters with stopped buses or show how often the software made the right decision in comparable situations.

Austin’s school district also helped arrange an exercise with school buses and stop arms so Waymo could collect data, [WIRED](https://www.wired.com/story/waymo-school-bus-problem-the-us-government-says-it-didnt-work/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) reported. That work took place after the original software fix and recall. The relevant test for the new inquiry is how reliably the cars behave on public roads, where a stop can involve oncoming traffic, vehicles moving around the bus and a decision about whether a car that has already stopped can safely proceed.

## What the federal review can establish

NHTSA closed its initial evaluation and moved the matter into the more focused [recall inquiry](https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2026/INOA-RQ26006-19477.pdf?ref=theamericanquorum.com). The incident records show that reports continued after the update, but the public notice does not say how many times the covered vehicles encountered stopped school buses. Without that denominator, the share of reports that came after the update cannot by itself show whether the rate of improper passing went up or down.

The federal inquiries therefore leave two questions open: how often the vehicles follow school bus stop signals in the field, and what caused the cases in which they did not. The [safety board](https://www-s.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/HWY26FH007.aspx?ref=theamericanquorum.com) is investigating the Austin events with a view to issuing recommendations. NHTSA’s immediate task is to determine whether the remedy was adequate and identify the causes of reports that followed it. Neither record announces a conclusion about the cause of every later incident.