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# Houthis Seize Hanish Islands as Yemen War Expands
- URL: https://www.theamericanquorum.com/houthis-seize-hanish-islands-as-yemen-war-expands/
- Published: 2026-09-15T04:31:19.000Z
- Updated: 2026-09-15T04:31:19.000Z
- Description: Yemen’s Houthis seized two strategic Red Sea islands and renewed attacks on Saudi Arabia, expanding their reach toward a vital shipping corridor as more than 85,000 people flee a rapidly widening offensive.
- Author: News Desk
- Tags: World

Yemen’s Houthis seized two Red Sea islands about 100 miles north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and launched a new round of missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, widening a battlefield that now reaches from Yemen’s interior to one of the world’s most important shipping corridors. Government and Houthi officials said forces moved onto Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish after government-aligned troops withdrew, the [AP reported](https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-saudi-shipping-mandeb-8c18d82c109a8ea91347ce53c0096c53?ref=theamericanquorum.com) Monday.

The island seizures came after the Houthis took the port of Mokha and Mayun, also known as Perim, inside the Bab el-Mandeb. On Monday, the group said it fired dozens of missiles and drones at King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait. Saudi officials said 13 civilians were injured and homes and vehicles were damaged, while offering no confirmation that the base itself was hit. By early Tuesday, Saudi civil defense had lifted alerts in six cities, including the Red Sea oil port of Yanbu, but the [all-clear](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-civil-defence-says-danger-has-passed-six-cities-including-yanbu-2026-09-15/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) addressed only the immediate threat.

The combined advances and strikes matter because they link three crises that had often been analyzed separately: Yemen’s civil war, the regional confrontation involving Iran and the United States, and the security of commercial routes through the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz. They also show why military control of small pieces of terrain can carry consequences far beyond Yemen. The islands do not by themselves close a sea lane, but they can support surveillance, staging and coercion around routes used by ships traveling between Asia, the Gulf, the Suez Canal and Europe.

## Why the islands matter

Greater and Lesser Hanish sit in the southern Red Sea, roughly 160 kilometers north of the Bab el-Mandeb. The strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Mayun is even more sensitive because it lies within the strait, separating its two navigable channels. Control of these locations can improve observation of vessel movements and give a force more options for launching or supporting attacks, although capability depends on what weapons, sensors and logistics can be sustained there.

The Houthis have already demonstrated that they can disrupt shipping without physically occupying the entire coastline or the strait. Attacks that began during the Gaza war prompted major carriers to divert vessels around southern Africa. A [UNCTAD analysis](https://unctad.org/news/unprecedented-shipping-disruptions-raise-risk-global-trade-unctad-warns?ref=theamericanquorum.com) found that weekly container-ship transits through the Suez Canal had fallen 67% by February 2024 as companies avoided the Red Sea. The longer route around the Cape of Good Hope adds time, fuel use and insurance expense, costs that can move through supply chains even when cargo arrives safely.

The latest gains therefore change the risk calculation more than the legal geography. The Houthis do not need to halt every vessel to affect freight decisions. Shipping companies and insurers price uncertainty, and a credible possibility of attack can be enough to change routes. On Monday, tracking data showed 21 commodity-vessel transits through Bab el-Mandeb, down from 28 the previous day, while [Reuters reported](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hormuz-traffic-dwindles-after-middle-east-attacks-intensify-2026-09-15/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) only four commodity-vessel crossings at Hormuz, down from 10.

## Two chokepoints under pressure

The Red Sea escalation is especially consequential because the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf’s main outlet, is already operating under severe pressure. Before the regional war began on Feb. 28, about 125 large commercial vessels used Hormuz each day, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has described Hormuz as the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint; its [energy review](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504&ref=theamericanquorum.com) found that flows through the strait in 2024 and early 2025 equaled more than one-quarter of seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption.

Saudi Arabia built its East-West Pipeline to reduce that exposure by moving crude from the kingdom’s eastern fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea. A separate attack last week, which Riyadh blamed on Iran-backed militias in Iraq, knocked the line largely out of service. Regional officials told the AP that repairs could take three to five weeks. That incident is distinct from the Houthi island campaign, but together they narrow Saudi export options: a pipeline designed to bypass Hormuz ends at a coast now facing greater missile, drone and maritime risk.

Bab el-Mandeb had already lost much of its oil traffic after earlier Houthi attacks. [EIA data](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=63446&ref=theamericanquorum.com) show that crude oil and petroleum-product flows through the strait averaged 4 million barrels a day from January through August 2024, less than half the 8.7 million-barrel daily average recorded in 2023\. Those figures do not establish what the current offensive will do to volumes, but they show how quickly security concerns can redirect energy trade.

## A renewed Yemen front

The military advance also marks a sharp reversal of the relative calm that followed the U.N.-brokered truce of 2022\. That agreement formally expired after six months, yet the front lines remained comparatively stable for years. The U.N. envoy called it the longest period of relative calm since the war began in a [2022 statement](https://osesgy.unmissions.org/statement-secretary-general-nationwide-truce-agreement-yemen?ref=theamericanquorum.com). The current fighting has broken that pattern.

Since early September, Houthi forces have pushed through areas held by Yemen’s internationally recognized government, while Saudi and Yemeni aircraft have struck Houthi positions around Mokha, Dhubab and Taiz. Officials from the government side told [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-strike-saudi-targets-anew-talks-over-strait-hormuz-stall-2026-09-15/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) that the Houthis now effectively control almost the entire western coastline. The Houthis, who took Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014, retain the populous northern heartland as well.

That does not mean the outcome is settled. Government forces are attempting to regroup, and holding newly acquired territory requires troops, supply lines and protection from airstrikes. The Saudi-led coalition has far greater air power, while the Houthis possess a long record of dispersing missiles and drones, operating from difficult terrain and absorbing bombardment. A widening campaign may therefore create more opportunities for attack without producing a quick military decision.

## Civilians absorb the expansion

The clearest immediate result is displacement. The International Organization for Migration said 85,818 people had been displaced by the renewed fighting as of Sept. 13, including 82,164 since the start of the month, and more than 2,000 had crossed to Djibouti. The [IOM figures](https://yemen.un.org/en/322641-iom-yemen-yemen-displacement-tops-85000-conflict-continues-2000-flee-djibouti?ref=theamericanquorum.com) point to the largest concentrations in Taiz, Lahj and Hodeidah, areas close to the shifting western front and routes toward Aden.

Families arriving near Aden described separation from relatives and flight with little more than what they could carry. More than 200 schools had been converted into shelters in southwestern Yemen, aid officials told the AP. A separate [Reuters account](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-displaced-long-loved-ones-stability-houthis-advance-2026-09-14/?ref=theamericanquorum.com) documented people sleeping in makeshift camps as roads, communications and insecurity complicated efforts to learn whether relatives were safe.

This new emergency is landing on top of a national crisis, not replacing one. A June [UN assessment](https://yemen.un.org/en/317368-un-yemen-country-results-report-2025?ref=theamericanquorum.com) projected that more than 21 million Yemenis would need assistance in 2026, with 18.3 million facing acute food insecurity and 2.2 million children under five acutely malnourished. Yemen imports about 90% of its food, and only about 59% of health facilities were fully functioning. Renewed combat can interrupt transport, raise prices, damage clinics and schools, and make aid access more dangerous even outside the immediate front.

## Diplomacy narrows as risks widen

Oman had planned to host talks Monday between Iran and Gulf Arab states about arrangements for reopening Hormuz. The meeting was postponed, with Tehran saying the delay came at Saudi Arabia’s request. The competing accounts matter less than the result: the principal diplomatic channel for reducing pressure at one chokepoint stalled just as fighting intensified around the other.

Washington has so far resisted Saudi requests for direct military intervention beyond intelligence and targeting support, according to three sources cited by Reuters. That restraint limits the immediate risk of a new U.S. strike campaign, but it does not resolve the underlying contest. Saudi Arabia must decide how forcefully to counter Houthi advances without reopening an open-ended war; Iran benefits from pressure on U.S. partners but also faces the danger of escalation; and Yemen’s government must defend territory while managing a fragmented coalition.

The next signals will be practical ones: whether government forces can retake Mokha or Mayun, whether the Houthis install lasting military infrastructure on the islands, whether commercial carriers change routes again, and whether the postponed Gulf-Iran talks are rescheduled. Until then, the Hanish seizure should be understood neither as a symbolic land grab nor as proof that the Houthis can close the Red Sea at will. It is a material expansion of their reach in a corridor already carrying less traffic, beside a country already unable to absorb another full-scale war.